In spite of basic differences in physician market, we have to consider main derivatives of physician services pricing. Analyzing the marginal cost of generalist and specialist shows that the “fee splitting” occurs when there is a divergence between price and the marginal opportunity cost of specialist. We hope that when the prices of such services are equal with marginal costs, the kickbacks will be vanish. In other words, fee splitting becomes a tool for eroding monopoly power it provides a channel to transfer some part of specialists’ monopolistic power to generalists. In this study we use three economical theoretic instruments to analyze the fee splitting. First of all, by using the “theory of agency” we can discuss about the physician violations from their tasks as an agent. Afterward we apply theoretical principles of behavioral economics to examine the differences between physicians and other economic factors decision making. Finally we analyze the marginal cost differences between generalists and specialists to clarify the main economic origins of fee splitting