Volume 20, Issue 61 (4-2026)
MLJ 2026, 20(61): 691-705 |
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Aghdastinat H R, Rafiee Moghadam A. The Necessity or Permissibility of Contracts for the Transfer of Human Organs from the Perspective of Medical Law and Islamic Jurisprudence. MLJ 2026; 20 (61) :691-705
URL: http://ijmedicallaw.ir/article-1-1999-en.html
URL: http://ijmedicallaw.ir/article-1-1999-en.html
1- Department of Theology, Faculty of Law and Theology, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran.
2- Department of Law, Faculty of Law and Theology, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
2- Department of Law, Faculty of Law and Theology, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
Abstract:
Background and Aim: By enacting the Single-Article Law on the Transplantation of Organs from Deceased Patients or Patients with Confirmed Brain Death in 2000, the Iranian legislature recognized the transplantation of human organs from deceased persons and individuals whose brain death has been conclusively established. However, Iranian statutory law contains no explicit provision governing contracts concerning the transfer of human organs from living persons.
Method: This is a theoretical study employing a descriptive-analytical approach and relying on library-based research.
Ethical Considerations: Throughout all stages of the preparation of this study, the originality of the texts, honesty, and academic integrity were observed.
Results: It appears that, irrespective of the type of contract invoked to characterize the legal nature of such agreements, and notwithstanding the principle of contractual binding force, such contracts should, in this particular context, be classified as revocable contracts (ʿaqd-e jāyez). This is attributable to their direct connection with the bodily integrity of the individual and their close relationship with personality rights.
Conclusion: Until an organ has actually been transplanted from a living person into another individual, such contracts may be revoked in any manner and on any ground. However, following the completion of the transplantation procedure, the transplanted organ is deemed, for legal purposes, to have been destroyed or consumed. Moreover, in view of the dignity and inviolability of the recipient’s personality rights and bodily integrity, and on the basis of the principle of contractual binding force, the parties cannot be regarded as having a right to revoke such contracts after transplantation has taken place.
Background and Aim: By enacting the Single-Article Law on the Transplantation of Organs from Deceased Patients or Patients with Confirmed Brain Death in 2000, the Iranian legislature recognized the transplantation of human organs from deceased persons and individuals whose brain death has been conclusively established. However, Iranian statutory law contains no explicit provision governing contracts concerning the transfer of human organs from living persons.
Method: This is a theoretical study employing a descriptive-analytical approach and relying on library-based research.
Ethical Considerations: Throughout all stages of the preparation of this study, the originality of the texts, honesty, and academic integrity were observed.
Results: It appears that, irrespective of the type of contract invoked to characterize the legal nature of such agreements, and notwithstanding the principle of contractual binding force, such contracts should, in this particular context, be classified as revocable contracts (ʿaqd-e jāyez). This is attributable to their direct connection with the bodily integrity of the individual and their close relationship with personality rights.
Conclusion: Until an organ has actually been transplanted from a living person into another individual, such contracts may be revoked in any manner and on any ground. However, following the completion of the transplantation procedure, the transplanted organ is deemed, for legal purposes, to have been destroyed or consumed. Moreover, in view of the dignity and inviolability of the recipient’s personality rights and bodily integrity, and on the basis of the principle of contractual binding force, the parties cannot be regarded as having a right to revoke such contracts after transplantation has taken place.
Method: This is a theoretical study employing a descriptive-analytical approach and relying on library-based research.
Ethical Considerations: Throughout all stages of the preparation of this study, the originality of the texts, honesty, and academic integrity were observed.
Results: It appears that, irrespective of the type of contract invoked to characterize the legal nature of such agreements, and notwithstanding the principle of contractual binding force, such contracts should, in this particular context, be classified as revocable contracts (ʿaqd-e jāyez). This is attributable to their direct connection with the bodily integrity of the individual and their close relationship with personality rights.
Conclusion: Until an organ has actually been transplanted from a living person into another individual, such contracts may be revoked in any manner and on any ground. However, following the completion of the transplantation procedure, the transplanted organ is deemed, for legal purposes, to have been destroyed or consumed. Moreover, in view of the dignity and inviolability of the recipient’s personality rights and bodily integrity, and on the basis of the principle of contractual binding force, the parties cannot be regarded as having a right to revoke such contracts after transplantation has taken place.
Background and Aim: By enacting the Single-Article Law on the Transplantation of Organs from Deceased Patients or Patients with Confirmed Brain Death in 2000, the Iranian legislature recognized the transplantation of human organs from deceased persons and individuals whose brain death has been conclusively established. However, Iranian statutory law contains no explicit provision governing contracts concerning the transfer of human organs from living persons.
Method: This is a theoretical study employing a descriptive-analytical approach and relying on library-based research.
Ethical Considerations: Throughout all stages of the preparation of this study, the originality of the texts, honesty, and academic integrity were observed.
Results: It appears that, irrespective of the type of contract invoked to characterize the legal nature of such agreements, and notwithstanding the principle of contractual binding force, such contracts should, in this particular context, be classified as revocable contracts (ʿaqd-e jāyez). This is attributable to their direct connection with the bodily integrity of the individual and their close relationship with personality rights.
Conclusion: Until an organ has actually been transplanted from a living person into another individual, such contracts may be revoked in any manner and on any ground. However, following the completion of the transplantation procedure, the transplanted organ is deemed, for legal purposes, to have been destroyed or consumed. Moreover, in view of the dignity and inviolability of the recipient’s personality rights and bodily integrity, and on the basis of the principle of contractual binding force, the parties cannot be regarded as having a right to revoke such contracts after transplantation has taken place.
Keywords: Organ Transplantation, Living Donor, Principle of Contractual Binding Force, Revocability, Personality Rights, Bodily Integrity, Human Dignity
Type of Study: Original Article |
Received: 2025/05/27 | Accepted: 2025/09/25
Received: 2025/05/27 | Accepted: 2025/09/25
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